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INTRODUCTION
Multinational military interventions that promote sustainable and enduring
peacebuilding measures have become increasingly challenged due to the com-
plex environments and the many different players that are brought into these the-
atres.  The reality of contemporary conflict environments is such that members
of the local population, who themselves remain the only agent for a sustainable
and peaceful change, are now able to view the behavioral conduct and opera-
tional effectiveness of the forces due to the close proximity in which they oper-
ate.  A common method used by warlords, nonstate actors and paramilitary
regimes to garner the support of local communities, is to offer security guaran-
tees in exchange for their support.  As a result, the main task for the internation-
al community in responding to these conflicts involves determining the basis for
local support and seeking to redirect the population’s allegiance toward the inter-
ventionist forces by demonstrating the provision of credible security.  Research
has indicated that disparate national approaches observed in recent multination-
al peace support operations have had an adverse effect on the way in which the
international military forces are perceived, due to a failure to build sufficient
confidence measures at the grass roots level of society. 
These situations test the professionalism of the military ground forces and
their application of doctrine.  However, troops serving in a multinational theatre
of operations are often deployed under the strategic requirements and tactical
procedures of regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE), as well under the more global auspices of the United Nations
(UN) – the world’s largest inter-governmental, multilateral organization.  The
“organizational” approach to pre-deployment planning, therefore, does not
always correspond directly with national doctrine.  Additionally, where there is a
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direct correlation between the organizational and the national approach, the
interpretation of the same set of rules and procedures can be completely differ-
ent.  This results in a disunity of effort on the ground, an increasingly blurred
local perception toward the international effort, and a prolonged conflict.  
Such factors are now considered of primary importance as calls from
Canada and her allies increase for enhanced military interoperability.  Much of
the discussion on interoperability has focused on Canada-US defence relations.
In the past decade, however, Canadian Forces (CF) have operated with a number
of other countries in various peace support operations, especially in the former
Yugoslavia.  Canadian defence policy still maintains that the CF must be pre-
pared for such operations in the future.      
This article will discuss the relationship between local populations and
multinational military forces and examine the importance of this relationship in,
what could be described as, “third generational conflict theatres.”1 It will then
discuss some national disparities observed in Bosnia and Haiti and seek expla-
nations behind these differences at the international, national and in-theatre lev-
els.  Lastly, the article will discuss recent initiatives aimed at minimizing the dif-
ferences and the impact this should have on national defence policy and military
leadership at all levels.
The Importance of Local Dynamics
Much has been written on the “new” security environment and the grow-
ing complexity of conflicts and humanitarian emergencies.  Whilst these emer-
gencies are not a new phenomenon, they have become an important subject area
for academics and practitioners due to the increased tendency of the internation-
al community to respond.  Military forces are no longer deployed along borders
or demarcation zones that separate antagonistic states.  Instead, they are expect-
ed to perform activities in the midst of these animosities, such as patrolling dan-
gerous areas, observing human rights violations, protecting military compounds
and international headquarters, rebuilding local infrastructures, and assisting in
the delivery and administration of humanitarian aid.
In the recent past, international military forces have been labelled as being
“passive spectators” and accused of  “turning their backs” on the atrocities and
human rights violations committed by the warring factions in these environ-
ments.  The charges have often evolved due, not to the fault of the individual sol-
dier, but to the national and international political forces that control their behav-
ior in the field.  In order to deploy troops to these regions, and search for a peace-
ful settlement to the conflict, the United Nations normally develops a mandate
that falls within the UN’s “Chapter VI” operations.  Chapter VI refers to the sec-
tion of the UN Charter that endorses military deployments that uphold the prin-
ciples of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in the case of self-
defence.2 
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The issue of consent is fairly straightforward.  In March 1995, the re-
installed Haitian government gave the UN permission to station international
military forces in various areas on the Caribbean island to help maintain securi-
ty and stability.  The intervention force, called the UN Mission in Haiti
(UNMIH), was authorized by the UN Security Council under a Chapter VI
peacekeeping mandate. The troops would be impartial to all individuals and
groups and pledged to maintain a stable and secure environment in which the
democratic Haitian government could be reinstalled. Lastly, the troops were only
permitted to use life-threatening force in self-defence and which was to be exe-
cuted in a graduated and measured way that ensured minimum collateral dam-
age.
These principles and procedures have applied to many other interventions,
as far back as the 1956 UN Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed to the Sinai, the
UN Force in Cyprus (UNFCYP), which is still stationed there today, the 1992
UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, the 1993 UN Preventative
Deployment (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia, and the ongoing UN Mission in Sierra
Leone (UNAMSIL).  These types of operations are most appropriate for the
issues discussed in this article due to the restrictions imposed on the troops and
the tasks they are expected to perform.
Chapter VI mandates are most common during the earlier and later stages
of the conflict.  If a conflict or humanitarian emergency deteriorates to the extent
that more robust military action is required, a new mandate is often issued under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorizes the use of force.3 The ratifica-
tion process behind approving the more robust UN mandate has proven difficult
in the past, particularly if it triggers sensitivities for certain UN Security Council
members who have the ability to exercise a veto.  Such a scenario prevailed dur-
ing early talks on the deployment of military troops to Kosovo, and the subse-
quent decision for the OSCE to lead due to the dual veto exercised by both China
and Russia.4 Alternatively, the entire operation can be taken over by a “coalition
of the willing” or a unilateral single-nation intervention.  The American and
British-led “coalition of the willing” in the 1990-91 Gulf War and the 1994 US-
led OPERATION RESTORE DEMOCRACY in Haiti serve as respective exam-
ples of these arrangements.  Thus, it is possible to categorize contemporary con-
flict interventions into the following three types: a UN-sanctioned/UN-led oper-
ation; a UN-sanctioned operation led by a regional organization; or a UN-sanc-
tioned intervention led by one “executive agent” or a small “coalition of the will-
ing.”  The American-led coalition, which launched airstrikes on Taliban military
strongholds in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, underlines the more recent utili-
ty of “coalition warfare.”  This action drew on American-led rules of engagement
and would be classified as the employment of air power to deter an aggressive
threat under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.5
When security and stability returns and humanitarian activity resumes, a
new UN mandate that upholds the same Chapter VI principles underwrites the
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new phase of operations.  International troops are expected to perform a more
integral role within the local society and assist in peace rebuilding programs,
security sector reform, and democratic development.  The forceful and more
robust approaches that feature in the earlier Chapter VII mandates are no longer
used, except in the case of self-defence.  In some cases, the military forces retreat
back to carrying out a support function only, in an effort to give primacy to a
newly developed security force and to re-empower local civil authority.  Such
was the case for the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), which succeeded
UNMIH in 1996.  A similar “single nation” parallel can be drawn with the British
Army’s ongoing intervention in Northern Ireland, where soldiers provide back-
ground support to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). 
It is during these transitional stages in multinational peacekeeping envi-
ronments that the local population either redirects its allegiance to the interna-
tional community (represented by the international military forces and humani-
tarian groups) or remains loyal to the individuals and groups behind the initial
demise of the country.  The latter occurs when conflict populations are not con-
vinced that the international forces can provide them with security at the indi-
vidual level.  This insecurity encourages them to turn to their factional group
leaders (or their own “stakeholder” group during the conflict) for reassurance.
Local warlords, nonstate actors, and paramilitary groups are aware of this phe-
nomenon and have used it to garner support and entice young recruits and child
soldiers.
On the other hand, the international forces can work hard to build the trust
and confidence necessary for the local residents to believe in their efforts and
support their programs.  Over time, the loosening of ties with the paramilitaries
and factional leaders encourages steps toward reconciliation and helps remove
bitterness.  Achieving such an environmental transformation and changed mind-
set is necessary before international funds are spent on infrastructural recon-
struction and societal rebuilding.  Convincing each individual person that his or
her own security is no longer at risk is paramount to a long-term solution.
There are many practical initiatives that can help to foster trust and credi-
bility and remove the deeply rooted fear that helped sustain the status quo ante.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to acknowledge all possible measures,
recommendations that address this problem from a military doctrinal and leader-
ship perspective will be explored.  The problem is examined in the context of
research carried out in Haiti during the third UN mandate, and during the 1996
Stabilization Force (SFOR) deployment in Bosnia.  Both cases involve the par-
ticipation of the CF, as well as many NATO and UN allies with whom Canada
will continue to serve in the future.  The choice of cases also reflects the con-
temporary nature of conflict, which includes a spectrum of activities ranging
from low-intensity warfighting to more tranquil peacebuilding tasks.  
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Research Methodology
The research used to support the arguments in this article formed part of a
doctoral dissertation that examined the disparities of multinational land forces in
peace support operations.  The study covered the multinational interventions in
Haiti (1994-96), Bosnia (1996, 1998 and 1999), Somalia (1997) and Northern
Ireland (1999), the latter of which was used to explore whether or not parallels
existed between the multinational research findings and a single nation interven-
tion.  Research was undertaken in each country using rural and urban sample sets
to increase the reliability of the data.  For example, in Haiti, the urban area of
Port-au-Prince and the rural areas in and around Cap Haitian were used.
Similarly, in Northern Ireland, the urban area of West Belfast and the rural area
of South Armagh were used.  The case of Bosnia proved more challenging as, to
maintain reliability and achieve accurate analyses, representation from many dif-
ferent rural areas was used to complement the research findings from the multi-
ethnic region in and around Sarajevo.  The same was true in the urban region of
Mogadishu, Somalia, and the various tribal clans represented in the rural dis-
tricts.
The data gathering, simulation, and interpretation phases of this work
employed a combination of both qualitative and quantitative research methods.
Due to the nature of the problem, and the extreme shortage of statistics in an
already underdeveloped area, a qualitative model based on interpretive quality
perspectives dominated.6 The mainstay of the data gathering involved numerous
interviews with local representatives, all of whom were asked the same questions
but who were also given room to elaborate on points which they clearly felt
strongly about and observations that were directly related to some of the inci-
dents that the author was investigating.   Each national sample set was made up
of the following proportions of respondents:  at least 35 percent from individu-
als between the ages of 18-35; at least 40 percent from individuals between the
ages of 35-50; and at least 20 percent from people in the 50+ age bracket.7 These
proportions were applied equally to each of the different ethnic factions repre-
sented in the areas researched.  The total number of people from the different
sample sets varied in number, however, they remained consistent in relation to
the population density of each area.  The author also augmented the research with
some quantitative research methods in order to monitor the reliability,8 and ward
off claims that the research relied too heavily on anecdotal comment.  
Following the analysis of the research, the author returned to each region
for validation and evaluation purposes.  Using smaller, but wholly representative
sample sets, a validation questionnaire9 was used which summarized the interim
research findings.  Individuals completing the questionnaires were asked to indi-
cate on a scale of five gradients whether or not they strongly agreed or strongly
disagreed with the findings.  The questionnaires left room for additional com-
ments, which were also incorporated into the research to enhance clarity. 
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The research methodology used was effective in penetrating the mindset of
the conflict communities and discovering how the behavior and performance of
different national militaries affected their overall impression of the multination-
al force and the role it would play in determining their future.  These issues are
important within the wider interoperability debate for two reasons.  First, inter-
operability extends beyond weapon procurement programs and defence spend-
ing, which looks at interoperability at the strategic level and not at the level of
implementation.  Second, efforts to achieve interoperability have encouraged a
mutual understanding, and the development of, collective defence doctrines;
however, controls must also be put in place in monitor the different interpreta-
tions of the common doctrine to limit adverse effects on the ground.
The next few sections will explore some of the background detail and
research findings from the Haiti and Bosnia case studies.  While the involvement
of the Canadian Forces will remain the focus of this article, it is important to
remember that the broader study encompassed an in-depth view of 12 other
nations, both NATO and non-NATO. 
Haiti
Haiti has suffered from civil unrest, government corruption, and oppres-
sive leadership for years.  The circumstances of its birth as an independent state
bestowed four potentially destructive legacies on Haitian society:  the passing of
power to the local Creole aristocracy; the precipitous and brutal changes of lead-
ership that became a model for future Haitian governments; the violent tactics of
Haiti’s founding leaders and the use of Voodoo; and, finally, the protracted wars
of independence that destroyed the island’s flourishing plantation economy.
The oppression of the Creole population by the Mulatto elite was chal-
lenged many times by renowned leaders like Toussaint Louverture, Francois
Duvalier, and his son who succeeded him, Jean-Claude Duvalier.  However, this
only created a black elitist regime, which continued to subject the majority of
Haitian people to the same oppressive, impoverished, and difficult life to which
they had become accustomed.  Each regime, along with their “extended” fami-
lies, controlled the few legitimate and illicit sources of economic wealth, politi-
cal control, and a powerful security apparatus that shared the riches.10
This kleptocratic nature of governance survived until the end of the
Duvalier legacy in 1986, and a series of similar regimes and bloody coups that
lasted for four years.11 In December 1990, the Roman Catholic Priest Jean-
Bertrand Aristide was sworn in as president by free and fair elections.12 A coup
d’état, led by senior military officials and the capital city’s chief of police,
removed him from power six months later.13 Following US-led efforts to broker
an agreement for the return of President Aristide and the military regime’s refusal
to implement it, a UN-sanctioned/US-led force mandated under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter was sent in to restore peace.  
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The mandate of the operation authorized the US force to use whatever
means necessary to return Aristide in accordance with the Governor’s Island
Agreement.14 On 31 March 1995, the force was replaced by the UN Mission in
Haiti, a multinational peacekeeping force acting under Chapter VI of the UN
Charter.  The force was tasked with maintaining a secure and stable environment,
assisting in the training of a new national police force, and facilitating a free and
fair electoral process.15 In 1996, the force was downsized and renamed the UN
Support Mission in Haiti Gendarmerie contingent and others participating in a
UN Civilian Police Force (UNCIVPOL).  A small group of US Army logisticians
also provided support and were stationed at an airport compound.  Its task was
to assist in the professionalization of the national police force and in the mainte-
nance of a secure and stable environment.        
Bosnia
The events which preceded the deployment of SFOR in Bosnia had slight
similarities to the international arrangements in Haiti, but came with complexi-
ties that were reminiscent of a region made up of about seven different ethnic
factions, some of whom were fighting against themselves, and with conflict rag-
ing throughout the country (for different reasons depending on where one lived).
In addition, the ambiguous political system that continued to change as the
Yugoslav federation fell apart, posed huge legal challenges to members of the
international community who were poised to intervene.  Threatened Serb minor-
ity populations in Croatia and subsequent fighting along Croatia’s border with
Bosnia resulted in the deployment of a Chapter VI peacekeeping force tasked
with monitoring the designated “UN Protected Areas” containing those popula-
tions.16
The independent recognition of both Croatia and Slovenia encouraged
more violence.  By this time, similar problems had spread in and around the
Bosnian capital of Sarajevo where all three ethnic groups were co-located.  In
spring 1992, the UN responded to a plea from the Bosnian President, Alija
Izetbegovic, and sent in a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to facilitate the
delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid.17 Once again, the UN force served
under a Chapter VI traditional peacekeeping mandate and was expected to
uphold certain rules of engagement and principles associated with the mandate.
As the fighting in the former Yugoslavia spread and the situation deterio-
rated, combined with several failed attempts at brokering a diplomatic solution,
measures were increased to bring in NATO involvement and with it, a more
robust mandate.18 The deployment of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR)
in fall 1995 seriously weakened the position of the factional fighters,19 which
encouraged the factional leaders to seek diplomatic dialogue.  They were even-
tually brought to the negotiating table where they signed up to the US-brokered
“Dayton Peace Accords.”20
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NATO, under IFOR, lasted for one year and was replaced by SFOR, which
is still there today.  There are three area commands, all of which answer to a cen-
tral command in Sarajevo.21 While SFOR represents a UN-sanctioned/NATO-
led force subject to the authority of the NATO commanders, it is still deployed
in a peacekeeping/peacebuilding capacity and is therefore expected to carry out
the rebuilding and reintegration role inherent in post-conflict operations.             
The Local Response in Haiti
Research was carried out during the UNSMIH deployment to examine
whether or not different national military conduct and behavior impacted the
local population’s impression of the UN force.  Interviews were conducted on the
streets, in residential neighborhoods, restaurants/cafes, prisons, municipal offices
at the local police stations, in the more rural areas, and in the aid agency and mil-
itary compounds.  Views were gathered from the local inhabitants and interna-
tional personnel assisting in all phases of the operation.  Although this informa-
tion was collected during the UNSMIH deployment in spring 1996, feedback on
national military troops also included those who participated in earlier phases of
the intervention.
Feedback on the American troops was divided according to time periods:
during the earlier Chapter VII operation that authorized the use of force and the
later support role the forces contributed to the UN Force.  People generally felt
that the American military was the right force to bring in during the earlier days
of the conflict as a lightly-armed peacekeeping force would not have deterred the
violence, crime, and political unrest.  This was particularly the case for the peo-
ple interviewed in Port-au-Prince where the worst violence was erupting.
In the northern city of Cap Haitian, the American response to a particular-
ly violent firefight with the paramilitary group Force Armee d’Haiti (FAD’H),
resulted in increased support for the international force.  The incident saw
American warning shots to deter a gang member from shooting a pro-Aristide
demonstrator outside the Cap-Hatian police station, answered with direct fire
toward the American troops.  In response, the Americans shot and killed 10 of
the paramilitaries.  The response to the incident strengthened support for the
Americans in particular for at least two reasons.  First, it demonstrated to young
potential paramilitary recruits that similar behavior would not be tolerated and
showed the disincentives of subscribing to the cause.  
Second, residents of Cap Haitian commented on the renewed confidence
instilled by the American action, which led to the reopening of local businesses
that had been continually looted and robbed by the paramilitaries.  For the major-
ity of people in Haiti, any extra income besides state allowances was usually
made from market stalls in the city and town centres, thus, the American per-
formance had brought hope that the markets could function once again.  One for-
mer mayor even suggested that the robust, resolute approach proved to many
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people that the American’s current involvement in Haiti was different from the
nation-building tactics used between 1915-34 that had generated so much resent-
ment toward the US.22
After the arrival of other national troops contributors and the official han-
dover of command from the United States to the UN, local groups were able to
observe the behavior of several different military forces and remark on the way
they were managing the transformed peacekeeping/peacebuilding environment.
Local Haitians living around Port-au-Prince grew to resent the American military
forces for their insistence on using dedicated military vehicles (and not the open-
sided UN trucks used by the other national battalions).  Moreover, the locals
questioned the need for the tall heavily-manned guard towers that the American
forces had constructed at each of their sites, and the requirement to travel in
groups of no less than eight with heavy military vehicles wherever they went.
This approach during a more peaceful environment had a compelling psycho-
logical impact on the Haitian population and enhanced the understanding of the
UN presence.
The Pakistani battalion, which had been deployed since the transition to
the UN force in 1994, had seemingly developed a good rapport with the local
groups.  Many of those interviewed commented on the Pakistanis’ determined
look, the positioning of their guns and their attentiveness during patrolling activ-
ities, which made the Haitians believe that the Pakistanis were very much aware
and in control of the situation.  Their ability to combine this structured approach
with constant interaction with people, whether it was helping someone push a
wheel barrow down the street or building a soccer field for the children in a bad
neighborhood, built tremendous support for the Pakistani battalion in Haiti.
People acknowledged that this more than made up for their inability to commu-
nicate in the local language.  If any violence broke out, the large majority of peo-
ple interviewed were convinced that the Pakistanis would resist any aggression
and protect the population.
At a conference held in 1996, one British academic and former war
defence correspondent described the Canadian approach to peace support opera-
tions as “enormously generous but relying more on the use of ‘soft tactics’”
shaped by peacekeeping policy approaches similar to that of the Dutch and
Scandinavian countries.23 Recent debacles in Rwanda, Somalia and internal
problems within the Canadian National Defence Headquarters have, in the recent
past, put enormous pressure on the individual serving soldiers and have subject-
ed them to rigid procedures that have, according to Canadian soldiers and their
allied partners, restricted their operational freedom.  The continuous need for the
Canadian armed forces to be seen as militarily “clean” and “politically correct”
due to these past experiences has caused the average soldier to feel more limited
in using traditional robust approaches.  Thus, for the sake of satisfying a public
and government back home that seem ill-informed with regards to current oper-
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ational requirements, the reputation of the Canadian land forces as credible secu-
rity providers has been compromised.  The point here is that this is not due to the
individual level of competence or professionalism brought into theatre by each
soldier, but to the discouraging ethos that has been built by Canadian politicians
who repeatedly fail to see the role these individual men and women play in
defending Canadian national interests – at home and abroad – and support them
appropriately.          
In Haiti, shortly after the transition to the UN-led operation in 1995,
Canada was forced to modify its interpretation of the UN rules of engagement
(ROE) in order to protect a group of Canadian hydro workers who had been com-
mercially contracted to restore electricity to the capital city of Port-au-Prince.24
When a warehouse they were working in came under paramilitary fire, Canadian
troops had to request permission from the highest authorities to use force to deter
the attack.  The existing Canadian ROEs only permitted the troops to use force
“in the case of self defence” due to Canada’s insistence on the removal of “. . .
and in defence of property” from the same clause prior to deployment of troops.
Had Canada agreed to the original UN text, the ROEs during this incident would
have been clear and the Canadian troops would have had the freedom to deter the
attack from wherever they stood.  The only counterattack that their initial ROEs
would have permitted would have been for the troops to position themselves in
between the paramilitaries and the hydro compound in order to use force “in the
case of self defence” – clearly not an option in these violent circumstances.  The
ROEs were later modified to include the use of force in the case of self defence
“and also in defence of the mandate,” which could justify the protection of the
Canadian civilians.  Most countries already use this text despite the Canadian
belief that ambiguity in determining what would and would not threaten the man-
date may result in unnecessary violence.25
The restrictions on the Canadians were obvious even to the local inhabi-
tants.  When people described the Canadian’s approach to patrolling and escort-
ing they remarked that they did not appear to be in control as much as the
Pakistani troops.  In addition, feedback also suggested that the troops tended not
to hold their weapons at the ready position like their Pakistani colleagues.  There
was also a perception that the Canadian soldiers tended to avoid the more turbu-
lent areas of the city where needy reconstruction projects required their assis-
tance.  Reports on their failure to defuse and control several street-riots and stu-
dent protests, also highlighted the constraints under which they had to operate.  
Almost all of the respondents appreciated the kindness showed by the
Canadian military forces and the ease of communication through French cultur-
al and linguistic affinities.  Many respondents also commented on the friendli-
ness of the Canadians and their consistency in smiling and waving to the local
inhabitants.  Nevertheless, in the case of heightened security measures, only 12
percent of the 147 local respondents interviewed in the city of Port-au-Prince
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stated that the confidence they had in the Canadians as credible security
providers was quite low.26
The Local Response in Bosnia
Similar themes were noted from the research findings in Bosnia.  Local
Muslim, Serb, and Croat residents were interviewed in and around Sarajevo, in
the Bihac region of southwest Bosnia, Mostar, Banja Luka, Prijedor and in the
Central Bosnian corridor of Drvar, Jajce, Gornji Vakuf, and Bogojno.  Canadians
had served in many of these regions during different phases of the UN and NATO
intervention in the former Yugoslav Republic.  
Several Canadian soldiers recalled a well-known incident that occurred on
April 1998 in the central Bosnian town of Drvar.  During the repatriation of Serb
groups back to the now Croat-dominated town, the Croat residents of the area
rebelled and ignited riots on the streets.  The reactions of many Canadians were
described as being “confused” and “fearful.”  This apparently became more evi-
dent when many of the troops jumped back into their SFOR trucks in the hope
that the problems would die down.  Perhaps these reactions also reflected the fact
that, at that time, Canadian land force doctrine did not include crowd or riot con-
trol.  British troops arrived shortly after in armored vehicles and secured the area.
Many Croats and a significant number of the repatriated Serbs said that, at the
time, they were very happy to see the arrival of the British troops.
A number of Canadians interviewed concluded, fairly or otherwise, that,
although it would have been in the ROEs to shoot, the political ramifications
back home in Canada made them resist.27 Other more senior onlookers also
acknowledged that the ROEs were such that the troops could have fired, but that
the response would not have reflected the Canadian approach to these inci-
dents.28 The recommendations of a more senior officer were to always threaten
areas with future military presence as opposed to immediate robust reactions.  As
such, immediately following that incident, local authorities were instructed that
any further incidents would result in an indefinite deployment of SFOR troops in
the town.  Apparently, since that statement was issued no further problems in the
area were reported.  However, feedback from the local residents indicated that
the belated but robust intervention of the British soldiers had served to deter any
further incidents.  
Serbs in most areas did not warm to American ground troops due to sever-
al reasons.  When diplomatic efforts reached an impasse during the UN deploy-
ment in 1993, the American support for the “lift and strike” option caused some
degree of resentment.  Moreover, in various press releases and official state-
ments, visiting US officials rarely acknowledged the problems caused by the
Muslim and Croat populations in Bosnia.  This was particularly the case when
the Serbs received strong condemnation by the US in the February 1994 mortar
incident in the Sarajevo market despite the fact that incident reports analyzing
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the projection and impact of the firing weakened the argument that the Serbs bore
any responsibility.29
Most military personnel living and serving in Bosnia were aware of the
“heavy” approach used by the Americans when serving on the ground.  In the
context of the more recent American intervention in Kosovo, Lawrence
Freedman offers the following observations on the American obsession with
force protection.  
As a US Army brigade moved into Kosovo as part of the force that
intended to bring calm into the country after the war, its mission
statement listed as its first priority ‘self-protection’ with the ‘peace-
keeping tasks’ secondary.  While the troops of US allies intermingled
with the local population, US troops stayed in a guarded and well
appointed compound, separated from the society that they were sup-
posed to help calm.30
In Bosnia, inquiries into the travel plans of American troops at checkpoint
stops were often met with soldiers jumping out of heavily armed military vehi-
cles in order to guard the delegated spokesperson while he or she dealt with the
factional representatives.  This top-heavy approach, particularly during the
SFOR mandate that focused on peacebuilding and reconciliation, was viewed as
unnecessary and only served to raise anxieties among the ill-informed, and
aggravated others.  As in Haiti, the troops never travelled in groups of less than
eight people with a minimum of two armored personnel carriers.
Local residents believed that the Americans had little interest in speaking
and interacting with them.  They believed that the troops felt indifferent toward
understanding the local situation and lacked the capacity to think laterally and
beyond their own cultural beliefs.  Following the August 1997 shooting of the
Bosnian Serb paramilitary Simo Drljacha by British Special Forces.31 demon-
strations were mounted in front of the SFOR Civil-Military Centre (CIMIC) in
Prijedor which, at that time, was being manned by American officers.  The
CIMIC had been set up earlier that year to serve as an information centre for
locals and a place where they could speak to ground troops about various SFOR
programs and initiatives.  After this incident, the Americans on duty at the
CIMIC refused to speak to the locals or make efforts to defuse the situation,
which generated even more hostility.  Soon after the incident, they were replaced
by a group of Czech officers.
Bosnian Muslims living in the Bihac region recalled an incident that fur-
ther underscored the Americans’ reluctance toward understanding local dynam-
ics.  A number of American soldiers had been tasked with distributing IFOR
newsletters (a peacebuilding tool used to improve communications and under-
standing) in the area of Bos Krupa.  The newsletters were translated in slightly
different dialects and emphasized slightly different issues, depending on whether
the target audience was Serb, Muslim, or Croat.  Both the interpreters and a sub-
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stantial number of local residents realized that little care was being taken toward
the distribution of the material.  This indifferent and detached attitude, which was
exhibited on many occasions, undermined ethnic sensitivities and did not help
the Americans gain respect and credibility in a very ethnically mixed region.
Another incident in 1995 in the Bosnian town of Doboj also illustrates the
same “top heavy” American approach that tainted the Bosnians’ view of the
American forces during the peacekeeping and peacebuilding stages of that con-
flict.  A group of Muslims had been given permission by Danish and British
troops to cross a bridge to visit a cemetery (in the newly proclaimed “Serb” side
of town) where relatives had been buried.  Riots broke out and Serbs began chas-
ing Muslims, throwing stones and physically beating them.  As the British and
Danish troops fired warning shots into the air, their efforts were overshadowed
by the sudden appearance of American gunships, with blades tilted downwards
in order to spray stones and objects into the air in an “overkill” effort to move
back the crowd.  Several Danish and British officers who witnessed the incident
suggested that alternative, more graduated levels of force could have been used
to prevent further threats and violence.32 Many of the local residents who were
interviewed felt that the use of gunships had sent a very powerful message to the
factional militant groups in terms of consolidating more resources and heavier
equipment.  Other individuals felt that the Americans were trying to use “scare
tactics” to increase compliance in the area.
Due to the broad range of national troop contributors that served in Bosnia
between 1995-99, the local populations identified several other national tenden-
cies, which affected their perception of the international effort.  The behavior of
the Bangladeshi and Malaysian soldiers toward the Bosnian women and the sig-
nificant time they spent in local bars and restaurants had affected IFOR’s repu-
tation in both Sarajevo and Bihac.  In the more southern area of Mostar, while
the locals warmed to the Italian and Spanish troops, they worried about their abil-
ity to offer sufficient protection in the case where fighting re-ignited between the
Croat and Muslim factions in the area.  Residents in and around Sarajevo and
Mount Igman felt very strongly toward the French Foreign Legion’s “over the
top” approach to “spraying bullets in response to a tree branch breaking in the
wind.”33
The results proved that certain categories of military “professionalism,”
perceived from the local perspective, were observed in Bosnia.  On one end of
the scale were troops described as “net users” as opposed to “net contributors”
of security.  These included the Malaysians, Jordanians, Bangladeshis, and
Ukrainian troops.  To a certain extent, the Russians were also grouped in this cat-
egory, despite their potential to take strategic advantage of their historical
alliance with the Serb factions.  The national contingents described above were
considered a liability to the multinational effort, particularly in many instances
where impartiality, credibility, and professionalism were often compromised.
The Journal of Conflict Studies
73
This suggests that differences in approaches to ROE and thus, effectiveness, are
more the result of which forces the countries come from rather than a lack of
common training.  While common training programs would, without question,
help bridge the gaps, the cultural ethos that shapes a national military’s interpre-
tation and leadership approaches toward a common doctrine and ROE are cen-
tral to achieving a more unified response.  
Grouped in the next category were troops like the Spanish, the Dutch and
the Canadians.  These groups were known to practice softer and less robust sol-
diering, which, to the locals, would not be effective during periods of heavy vio-
lence.  In addition, the local perception was that these troops lacked the opera-
tional freedom necessary to offer adequate protection if tensions between the eth-
nic factions resurfaced.  On a more socio-behavioral point, the locals generally
felt that these troops kept a certain “distance” from the local groups and did not
engage themselves in the local environment as much as they could have.
Adjectives such as “withdrawn” and “detached” were used several times to
describe the approach of these groups to patrolling.  (However, it should be noted
that recent discussions with personnel from the Office of the High Representative
(OHR) and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)34 sug-
gested that the Canadian contribution in the “canton 10” region of central Bosnia
has made notable progress in the past few years in terms of interfacing with the
local community, coordinating with other civilian agencies, and assisting in the
peacebuilding strategies.  Admittedly, the threat in Bosnia has diminished and
social and economic rebuilding in multiethnic areas is now the priority – perhaps
a move away from the ambiguity inherent in volatile “Chapter VI 1/2”  theatres
has instilled the confidence required for the CF to have a more magnified pres-
ence.   
The French and Czech forces generated fairly positive feedback on their
military conduct and professionalism.  Locals from all ethnic backgrounds felt
safe in the company of Czech troops and applauded their way of handling tense
situations.  These observations were quite complementary to the Czech battalions
considering the fact that they were still adjusting to Western military practices
and were only just being folded into the NATO Alliance’s integrated military
structure.35
The Americans were criticized for their “top heavy” approach, particular-
ly during times when it was not necessary.  They were also described as being
insular and non-committal toward understanding and interacting at the local
level.  Generally speaking, local residents from all sides felt that the Americans
should not be used in such sensitive environments where relationship building
and positive encouragement were considered priorities.  This has implications for
a country whose technological superiority and projection of military power
excels at the highest of diplomatic and operational levels.  Perhaps there is sig-
nificant merit in John Hillen’s argument that “superpowers don’t do windows,”
which recognizes that NATO best serves its many different security roles by
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playing to the core competencies of its members36 – which, for the United States,
should perhaps not include Chapter VI peacekeeping in complex environments. 
The response to the British presence was more encouraging.  Local resi-
dents applauded their firm approach and impatience toward obstructionism.
However, they also felt that the British troops demonstrated a firm commitment
to understanding local circumstances in each community and made efforts to
remain informed at all times.  Individuals and groups seemed very aware of the
help that the British troops provided to other forces and were cognizant of the
leadership roles they assumed in different multinational situations.  The one crit-
icism that surfaced in Bosnia was the tendency for the British troops to refrain
from concealing their weapons, or carrying them into public places during sen-
sitive events aimed at rebuilding the social fabric of country, such as local elec-
tions and multiethnic council meetings, even during the post-Dayton phase when
peacebuilding strategies were progressing quite well.         
These disparities in national approaches have also been observed in multi-
national interventions elsewhere.  The 1993 slaughter of 25 Somali civilians car-
ried out by the Pakistani military contingent, in response to the shooting of two
Pakistani soldiers, and the subsequent exoneration of those who orchestrated the
slaughter, had significant ramifications.37 Not only did it upset any hope for an
interim peace agreement to be followed but also illustrated the differences
between how these incidents are handled by national governments and, therefore,
what does and does not serve as a deterrent for such actions.  
Of recent interest has been the overwhelming support for British interven-
tion in Sierra Leone and the criticism expressed toward the multinational
UNAMSIL force led by a Nigerian General, who allegedly answered to Lagos
rather than New York.38 The strategy of the British troops to offer better protec-
tion for residents of Freetown, to take control of several northern paramilitary
strongholds and to return refugees fleeing for Guinea, while incurring only one
fatality, represented a remarkably positive turn of events in a country controlled
by rebel forces.    
There are obviously many other incidents that may be investigated to
assess the collective impact of different national military approaches on a con-
flict population.  However, such preliminary observations recognize that incon-
sistent and incongruent national interpretations of multinational military proce-
dures, conduct, and leadership required to fulfil a mandate can have a negative
impact on the overall effort.  For example, the current “war on terrorism” will
carry interesting implications for the recently debated Turkish-led UN peace-
keeping force proposed by Algerian Ambassador Lakdar Brahimi to succeed the
interim British-led force in Kabul.      
Nor can different national contributors be heavily faulted for fine-tuning
rules of engagement according to their own national law.  Notwithstanding the
fact that multinational forces often operate under the operational control of a
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regional organization or the UN, donor nations will never be willing to have their
forces governed (and held legally accountable) to a standard that is not in accor-
dance with the donating country’s domestic law.39 But when it is known that
national legal constraints and political pressure will disturb the multinational
unity to the extent where it has a negative impact on the peace process, restric-
tions should be communicated and core competencies should be more clearly
defined.  Arguably, the reality of coalition warfare has already advanced to the
point where national exceptions to the force ROEs are accommodated – howev-
er, it is questionable whether or not the UN’s very political and ad hoc approach
to organizing Chapter VI (and Chapter VI 1/2) peacekeeping forces is familiar
with this template.   
Implications for Interoperability and Multinational Training
Current multinational training programs neither address this gap in devel-
oping standard approaches and uniform interpretation, nor do they provide ade-
quate resources to tackle the problem in the near future.  The UN has recently
been stripped of its “gratis programme” under the aegis of the UN Department
of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) whereby an increasing number of mil-
itary staff officers from the armies of the member states were assigned on loan,
or “gratis,” to UNDPKO.  While nearly one quarter of the department’s 400-plus
staff was in fact made up of national armed forces personnel, being “gratis”
meant that they worked for the UN and not their home country.  These “gratis”
officers contributed invaluably to contingency planning and operational training
prior to multinational deployments to areas such as Rwanda, Somalia and the for-
mer Yugoslavia.40
Due to internal bureaucratic problems and discontent fuelled by the finan-
cial limitations imposed on the less industrialized nations to fund officers
employed in New York City, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution in
September 1997 that called for an expeditious phasing out of all “gratis” person-
nel.  This left UNDPKO’s Training Unit with a staff complement that had been
reduced from 27 to four.  UNDPKO’s Training Unit had previously used the
input of the “gratis” officers to develop the curricula for all UN military training
programs and to represent the department as course trainers.  The diversity of
backgrounds and military experience added value to the training programs and
ensured that training was “multinational” in nature.
However, even with this program in place, most of the “gratis” officers
came from NATO countries or US allies, which did not accurately represent
national contributions in the most recent peacekeeping operations (i.e.
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nigeria).  As a result, there was a tendency to dupli-
cate NATO procedures and other templates that had been offered in the past by
leading NATO contributors.  The lack of proportional representation in peace-
keeping training forums, compounded by the phased out “gratis” program, poses
major challenges to multinational military training for future UN deployments.
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At the moment, the very small staff complement in the UNDPKO Training
Unit continues to run their bi-annual program called “Train the Trainers,” where-
by those responsible for peacekeeping training at the national level gather in
Turin, Italy for courses in Multinational Peacekeeping Training.  They are then
expected to return to their national training centres and incorporate the instruc-
tion and content into courses run at national training centres.
Discussions with many leading military nations indicated that only a lim-
ited number of member states sent designated “trainers” on these courses.
Certain national representatives felt that their own training modules were more
up-to-date and reflected current operational requirements for multinational inter-
ventions much better than the UN-sponsored course.  Some commented that the
research behind most of the UN course content was very outmoded and reflect-
ed the old Sinai-based peacekeeping principles that lacked a great deal of con-
temporary relevance.41 Others did not send any of their officers because it did
not consider the training to be “half as advanced” as their own national training
programs.42
Another problem, and perhaps something that could be developed and
facilitated much easier than an expanded training program, was a lack of quality
control mechanisms in place to ensure that the national interpretation of UN
ROEs and operating procedures was reunited under the multinational mandate
once troops arrived in theatre.  After the UN mandate and ROEs are agreed at the
highest levels and further endorsed by the UN Security Council (UNSC), con-
tributing nations send these UN templates back to their own national authorities
for further analysis.  The documents are sent to national legal experts who ensure
that the UN’s legal interpretation of the mandate is compatible with the con-
tributing nation’s own legal interpretation.  In addition, the Ministry of Defence
assesses the procedures and requirements according to its own national doctrine
and codes of conduct to ensure compatibility at the military level.  After any
requested changes or modifications are dealt with, final directives are issued and
operational planning for the multinational deployment begins.
Depending on whether time permits, pre-deployment training may take
place at national training centres.  However, the speed at which troops deploy,
particularly during the first rotation into theatre, becomes critical and therefore
minimizes the chances of providing training tailored to the specific mandate and
geographic region.  Therefore, the responsibility for ensuring uniformity of
response ultimately falls into the hands of the UN Force Commander once all
troops are deployed into theatre.  Faced with a multitude of other more demand-
ing responsibilities, such as holding meetings with political factions, negotiating
peace agreements and liasing with Heads of State, the UN Secretary General and
the Security Council, the Force Commander cannot be expected to monitor how
different nations interpret the same mandate.
Concepts and doctrine that embrace the more contemporary principles of
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peacekeeping are articulated in the NATO doctrine for peace support operations.
The growing pre-eminence of this doctrine, and its influence in Europe and the
US, is also encouraging a degree of apathy toward UN peacekeeping concepts
and training.  As the declared “custodian” for NATO doctrine for peace support
operations, the UK has been hugely influential in shaping recent military train-
ing programs in all of the NATO and associate member states.  It recognizes the
complex evolution of peace support operations and how different contingencies
affect the response requirements.  The doctrine also acknowledges the vast num-
ber of civilian agents and the continuum along which transitional management
and lead-agent responsibilities become exceptionally important.
There is now a significant divide between countries that subscribe to the
NATO doctrine and those who remain loyal to the UN’s outdated approach.
Defence analysts might argue that NATO’s lead on military training is more
appropriate, considering its recent involvement as lead agency in peace support
operations in the Balkans.  Nonetheless, it is imperative that the international
community decides which organization should take the lead in training future
multinational forces and recognizes that softer, more traditional peacekeeping
principles cannot be definitely separated from more robust postures.
A few recent initiatives have attempted to bridge the gulf between UN and
NATO approaches toward the development of contemporary peacekeeping prac-
tices.  NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADR-
CC) at NATO Headquarters in Brussels is now reviewing the “Oslo Guidelines,”
first drafted by the UN’s Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA).  The guidelines advise UN and NATO members on how their assets can
become immediately deployable to help respond to natural disasters within
NATO’s area of operations.  More recent discussions have advanced the debate
to also include out-of-area “complex humanitarian emergencies” in light of
NATO’s precedent-setting “non-article V” interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo.
This process has called for the inclusion of UN OCHA staff within the EADR-
CC, which may drive a more prosperous and transparent relationship between the
two organizations.
Other initiatives have arisen from ambitious recommendations published
in the Brahimi Report, the most important of which include the development of
meaningful criteria and techniques to identify and respond to conflicts in a more
robust fashion; an increased role for regional organizations in peacekeeping; and
greater coherence and coordination among security, trade, and development
institutions in conflict prevention. However, these efforts are being stymied by
the insistence of developing countries that equal organizational focus and
resources be directed towards development issues, such as the elimination of
poverty and HIV/AIDS.43 The Office of the UN Secretary-General has acknowl-
edged these concerns and, as a result, has requested that priority be placed on
developing strategies for conflict prevention, something that each side of the
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debate regards as a half-way house between sustainable development and con-
flict intervention.44 The change of focus has also posed difficulties in generating
consensus among member states to endorse further job appointments in the
DPKO necessary for the full implementation of many of Brahimi’s recommen-
dations.
National Solutions 
The results of the research hardly seem encouraging in the wake of
increased calls for better multinational interoperability.  From a Canadian per-
spective, phrases such as “achieving close strategic partnerships” and “interop-
erability with Canada’s principal ally” feature significantly in the Canadian Chief
of Defence’s Strategy 2020 paper, as well as in the most current literature on
Canada’s strategic defence priorities.  These statements were not only in refer-
ence to the United States, but also to “other like-minded states” with which the
Canadian forces would find themselves deployed in the future.45 This type of
interoperable co-operation requires clearly defined, commonly accepted and
attainable objectives, all of which should create the conditions to achieve a unity
of effort in theatre.
This is particularly the case when peace support operations and humani-
tarian missions still remain high on Canada’s agenda and reflect a closer cooper-
ation with other government departments, such as the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA), in keeping with “joined-up” government.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to elaborate on the mammoth
subject of inter-operability with the United States – a relationship which former
Canadian Defence Minister Art Eggleton described as the “closest defence rela-
tionship in the world”46 –  it is important to delineate between levels of interop-
erability and what Canada should be moving to achieve.   The technological
advancements and defence trade and partnering at the strategic level must be
complemented with the correct training and knowledge-sharing at the opera-
tional and tactical levels.  What good is the most advanced shared weapons sys-
tem if it is not operated in harmony and cohesion with like-minded allies?  The
same argument holds true for the need to unite a headquarters vision with the
same vision of the soldiers representing that headquarters on the ground.  If
multinational interoperability is to be achieved and progressed, it must be taken
right down to the unit level.  The coalition and allied warfare of the future will
see armored infantry companies of one nation serving under the battalion lead-
ership of another.  Such was already the case when the Canadian infantry pro-
vided a reconnaissance support company under the British battalion and brigade
commands in 1998 in Kosovo.47 Building the weapons defence and intelligence
systems to deter attacks such as 11 September 2001 is only one part of multina-
tional interoperability – post-attack overseas deployments, ceasefire monitoring,
ground force operations and post-conflict peacebuilding are also essential ele-
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ments of the broader equation.  This extends the more parochial view of interop-
erability and builds it into a broader, more strategic context.  Such a vision may
make it possible for Canada to achieve its five-year target objective of “manag-
ing our interoperability relationship with the US and other allies to permit seam-
less operational integration at short notice.”48
But is it in fact Chapter VI peacekeeping to which the Canadian forces will
aspire in the future?  Evidence from their recent intervention in Afghanistan sug-
gests otherwise.  While carrying out combat operations and conducting joint
training with the Americans in Kandahar, there is still no interim peace in
Afghanistan, implying that the Canadians are in fact operating in a war zone
characterized by the legalities embedded in Chapter VII of the UN Charter which
underwrites “peace enforcement.”  This raises the question of whether or not the
Canadian forces, through interoperability, are implicitly taking themselves away
from, peacekeeping (even the more “robust” kind), toward peace enforcement.
Given the limitations on Canadian military resources, as well as the need to be
selective about future operations, does mean that Canada will not be able to do
both.  The fact that Canada placed itself under the operational control of the
American forces and not the British-led peacekeeping force, could open up argu-
ments that make this debate even more complex – the fact that there now may be
a NATO way of doing things, a UN way of doing things, and a new Canada-US
approach to peace support.   
Whatever the case may be it is important to remember that Canada prides
itself on being an advanced liberal democracy with a quality of life that is sec-
ond to none.  Much of this profile derives itself from a responsible government
that is committed to policy based on populous vote.  It is perfectly acceptable that
the Canadian government wishes to be selective about its future involvement in
other peoples’ wars – in fact, the government should be able to decide whatever
it wants for its armed forces because it reflects the choice of the Canadian peo-
ple.  However, for the tasks that are given to the Canadian Forces, it is essential
to give them the tools that they need – this includes public opinion and political
resolve.  
As for training and doctrine, a focus on national leadership and policy
may be the best step forward.  Both doctrine and training are important functions
of ethical military leadership and, where troops serve in multinational theatres of
operations, commanders must realize that different national interpretations can
result in disparities within an agreed series of legal responses and procedures.  As
such, the following recommendations are proposed to improve Canada’s position
as an interoperable land force partner in future peace support operations:
• National Defence Headquarters should undertake research that explores
the “positioning” of different national troop contributors in terms of
manpower, fighting power, capability, and deployability, along with the
cultural mindset and public and political support each nation brings to a
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theatre.  Such a study could further identify nations in broader cate-
gories, perhaps labelled as “front line,” “second line” or “support line”
peace interventionists.  As each country finds its position and establish-
es the goals it must pursue to achieve multinational interoperability with
its allies, benchmarking the successful approaches and conduct of “like”
countries may help them to reach their objectives and, more important-
ly, improve unity of effort in difficult and challenging circumstances.
• Multinational land force training must also underscore the fact that the
different interpretation of ROEs by one national military contingent can
seriously undermine the progress achieved by another.  “Lessons
learned” and “after-action reports” must be carefully monitored and fed
back into the national and multinational training curricula, supported by
explanations of why other multinational partners handled an incident in
a particular way and the short to medium term impact of such dispari-
ties.  This is currently covered at the Canadian Land Forces Command
and Staff College, but with more emphasis on warfighting rather than in
peace support operations.      
• The seven-day course held at the Canadian Forces Peace Support
Training Centre in Kingston, Ontario should include an element of
“partner culture” within the current module on cross-cultural aware-
ness.  This part of the course focuses mainly on the cultural norms in the
peace support theatres into which the delegates are about to be
deployed, as well as including some basic language training.
Combining some background knowledge on the other national military
forces with which the Canadians would be serving would be an added
benefit.
• Canada should continue its active participation and current level of
commitment within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework at
NATO.  The Canadian Forces play a significant role in many of the
exercises that fall under the Partnership Work Programme (PWP), a
“menu” from which NATO partners can choose to pursue goals and
objectives that increase their chances for full accession to the alliance.
As Canada continues to play a peace support role in Afghanistan, bene-
fits will accrue from PfP experience with countries like Uzbekistan and
being familiar with its doctrine and equipment.   
• Modules offered to Canadian and foreign civilian and military repre-
sentatives at the Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training
Centre should include lectures on the disparities of ROE interpretation
and behavioral conduct and the impact these disparities can have, not
only on the peace process, but also the ongoing development programs.
The Pearson Centre could provide a forum for rich dialogue between
these partners, particularly as it attracts delegates from both UN and
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NATO countries.  Parallel efforts should be made to publish the results
of these syndicate discussions, presentations, or group assignments in
order to build on the debate in a much broader and more representative
way. 
• Theatre war games and tactical exercises integrated into staff college
modules should consider the implications of joining certain national
military partners serving under the same multinational flag (although,
quite understandably, theatre wargaming exercises are geared more
toward warfighting rather than peacekeeping).  The conclusion drawn
by the research in this article suggesting that UN member states remain
divided between subscribing to the “NATO” as opposed to the “UNDP-
KO” approach to doctrine and training, should be conveyed to both jun-
ior and senior staff courses.  Efforts should also be made to inform
Canadian military representatives serving in foreign delegations and on
the international military staffs of inter-governmental organizations,
such as NATO, UN, the European Union and the Organization for
Cooperation and Security in Europe, of the division between UN and
NATO approaches and the impact this has on conflict communities. 
• The Canadian government should review the relationships between the
National Defence Headquarters, the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, and CIDA in terms of “joint” policy and planning
functions.  In today’s peace support operations, the wide spectrum of
activities in which ground forces find themselves engaged requires the
close cooperation and transparency between those responsible for diplo-
macy, defence, and sustainable development.  This closer interface will
be required for planning at the strategic and operational levels.
• The National Defence Headquarters should consider developing a
Combined and Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre dedicated to the
continuous development of Canadian Defence Doctrine, including doc-
trine for peace support operations.  This should be viewed as a dynam-
ic process which remains in line with national interests and in keeping
with a “joined up” government policy on defending Canadian interests
abroad. 
• Lastly, in terms of civilian education, university modules that teach
undergraduate and postgraduate students about the principles of con-
temporary peacekeeping should discuss the need for multinational
forces to combine a “human face” and a commitment to the local
dynamics, with a robust military posture.  This requires a sound under-
standing of not only the cultural environment and the wider spectrum of
activities ranging from peace enforcement to post-conflict peacebuild-
ing, but also effective transitional management approaches necessary to
support these changes.  Emotional wounds take a long time to heal and
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fractious and divided communities can easily regress if they perceive
that the international civil and military communities cannot guarantee
their basic safety and security needs for stability.  Much of the Canadian
literature on peacekeeping principles has been based on the founding
principles upheld by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre49 – principles
that are much less “absolute” in contemporary “Chapter VI 1/2” conflict
zones.    
CONCLUSION
This article has examined the realities and uncertainties of current conflict
landscapes and the challenges posed to military interventionist forces deployed
to these areas.  It has also emphasized that, despite claims of a changing future
strategic threat, that most interventions will almost always include the deploy-
ment of ground forces, either before, during, or after an actual targeted attack.
For this reason, it is essential that future policies on multinational and bilateral
interoperability consider the more operational and tactical requirements that are
essential for improving cohesion and unity of effort on the ground.
Empirical research undertaken in Bosnia and Haiti underlined the signifi-
cance of the local populations in these areas and how international military
forces must view these groups as the main stakeholders of conflicts and the only
key to a sustainable peace.  If, through inconsistent behavior and disparate
approaches of multinational troops, the local groups re-evaluate their allegiance
to the international effort, they may easily fall vulnerable once again to the forces
that ignited the conflict in the first place.  Once this happens, the prospect of a
sustainable peace becomes more uncertain and the task of the interventionists
becomes increasingly difficult.  
Calls for increased efforts for Canada to achieve multinational interoper-
ability with her allies has resulted in a plethora of documentation on the subject,
primarily with regards to fostering the country’s defence relationship with the
United States.  However, while much of the literature stresses the importance of
trade partnerships, the shared defence industrial base, and advanced weapons
systems, complementarity at the tactical and operational levels must also be
included in the interoperability equation.  These objectives will only be met
through more “multinational” training, inter-agency coordination, and joint doc-
trine development, as well as enhanced clarity between Canada’s political mas-
ters and the soldiers on the ground.
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